Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Stegemann, Klaus
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 834
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
In many ways, the international regulation of dumping looks like a model of successful multilateral rule making. Yet the systemic justification of anti-dumping measures is dubious, and international rule making has perversely served to expand the scope for regulatory protection. The multilaterally agreed rules have made protection too easy, as compared to the standards that are used to regulate predatory behavior under domestic competition laws and as compared to the standards stipulated for safeguard measures under Article XIX of the GATT. This paper also explores the reasons why the deregulation of dumping will be difficult
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.