Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18904
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dc.contributor.authorLeininger, Wolfgangen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:42Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:42Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18904-
dc.description.abstractThe implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in finite populations haverecently been explored for a variety of aggregative games. This note proves anintimate relationship between submodularity and global evolutionary stability ofstrategies for these games, which -apart from being of independent interest -accounts for a number of results obtained in the recent literature: we show thatany evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of a submodular aggregative game mustalso be globally stable. I.e. if one mutant cannot successfully invade a population,any number of mutants can even less do so.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1266en_US
dc.subject.jelC79en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwEvolutionäre Spieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleFending off one means fending off all : evolutionary stability in submodular gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn856884529en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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