Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18895 
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dc.contributor.authorPonssard, Jean-Pierreen
dc.contributor.authorLarmande, Françoisen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:38Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:38Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18895-
dc.description.abstractIncentives theory suggests that compensation schemes should be analyzed along twodimensions: controllability and congruence. Most schemes cannot satisfy both criteria at once.EVA bonus schemes, a major managerial innovation of the 90's, favor the congruencecriterion. This paper questions ist properties along the controllability dimension. The questionis addressed through an in-depth case study: after three years in operation the actual bonusespaid by the system, as well as qualitative feedback from the managers involved, are analyzed.It is argued that EVA bonus schemes may have a major controllability problem.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1257en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelD8en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEVA management compensationen
dc.subject.keywordcontrollability-congruence trade-offen
dc.subject.keywordcompensation standardsen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Wertschöpfungen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwLeistungskontrolleen
dc.titleEVA and the controllability-congruence trade-off : an empirical investigation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn856873926en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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