Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/188880
Authors: 
Ponte, Borja
Fernández, Isabel
Rosillo, Rafael
Parreño, José
García, Nazario
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management (JIEM) [ISSN:] 2013-0953 [Volume:] 11 [Year:] 2018 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 535-541
Abstract: 
Purpose: We expand a previous discussion in this journal by proposing a new solution concept, based on game theory, for profit allocation with the aim of aligning incentives in collaborative supply chains. Design/methodology/approach: Through the Gately's notion of propensity to disrupt, we minimize the desire of the nodes to leave the grand coalition in the search of a self-enforcing allocation mechanism. Findings: We discuss the benefits and limitations of this solution in comparison with more established alternatives (e.g. nucleolus and Shapley value). We show that it considers the bargaining power of the nodes, but it may not belong to the core. Originality/value: Finding a fair and self-enforcing scheme for incentive alignment, and specifically profit allocation, is essential to ensure the long-term sustainability of collaborative supply chains.
Subjects: 
beer game
game theory
Gately point
incentive alignment
profit allocation
supply chain collaboration
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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