Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/188879
Authors: 
Müller, David
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management (JIEM) [ISSN:] 2013-0953 [Volume:] 11 [Year:] 2018 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 528-534
Abstract: 
Purpose: The aim of the paper is to pick up the result of a previously published paper in order to deepen the discussion. We analyze the solution against the background of some well-known concepts and we introduce a newer one. In doing so we would like to inspire the further discussion of supply chain collaboration. Design/methodology/approach: Based on game theoretical knowledge we present and compare seven properties of fair profit sharing. Findings: We show that the nucleolus is a core-solution, which does not fulfil aggregate monotonicity. In contrast the Shapley value is an aggregate monotonic solution but does not belong to the core of every cooperative game. Moreover, we present the Lorenz dominance as an additional fairness criteria. Originality/value: We discuss the very involved procedure of establishing lexicographic orders of excess vectors for games with many players.
Subjects: 
beer game
cooperative game theory
profit allocation
Shapley value
nucleolus
core-selection
aggregate monotonicity
Lorenz set
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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