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dc.contributor.authorDalgic, Enginen
dc.contributor.authorLong, Ngo Vanen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:34Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:34Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18886-
dc.description.abstractWe study the role of tax share and transparency of governance on growth and stagnation. Alocal government maximizes its private benefits using two activities. The first one consists ofproviding local public goods that help local firms to increase profits, thus enlarging taxrevenue. The second one consists of extortion. We show that there is a threshold level of localgovernment tax share, and a threshold level of transparency. Below these thresholds, theeconomy will stagnate and above them, the economy will achieve perpetual growth.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1248en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordgrowthen
dc.subject.keywordlocal governmenten
dc.subject.keywordtax shareen
dc.subject.stwKommunalpolitiken
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwLokales öffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwGemeindesteueren
dc.subject.stwRegionales Wachstumen
dc.subject.stwSteuerbelastungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCorrupt local government as resource farmers : the helping hand and the grabbing hand-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn856737674en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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