Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18886
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dc.contributor.authorDalgic, Enginen_US
dc.contributor.authorLong, Ngo Vanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:34Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:34Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18886-
dc.description.abstractWe study the role of tax share and transparency of governance on growth and stagnation. Alocal government maximizes its private benefits using two activities. The first one consists ofproviding local public goods that help local firms to increase profits, thus enlarging taxrevenue. The second one consists of extortion. We show that there is a threshold level of localgovernment tax share, and a threshold level of transparency. Below these thresholds, theeconomy will stagnate and above them, the economy will achieve perpetual growth.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1248en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordgrowthen_US
dc.subject.keywordlocal governmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordtax shareen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunalpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwLokales öffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwGemeindesteueren_US
dc.subject.stwRegionales Wachstumen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerbelastungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCorrupt local government as resource farmers : the helping hand and the grabbing handen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn856737674en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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