Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18882
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorEggert, Wolfgangen_US
dc.contributor.authorWeichenrieder, Alfons J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:33Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:33Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18882-
dc.description.abstractDeposit systems for one-way beverage containers are widely supported by greenactivists and have been implemented in several countries. This paper analyzeswhether such deposit systems can optimally internalize the externalities that resultwhen consumers dump these containers. It is shown that two major problems arisein a competitive market. First, the proceeds from bottle deposits tend to reduce theprice of beverages in a competitive environment and therefore lead to a departurefrom a first best allocation. Second, the system usually requires producers andvendors to run a system for taking back and recycling used containers, whose costvendors can only partly shift to consumers who return their bottles. While adeposit system alone is never optimal, the paper proposes tax-deposit systems thatcan implement a first-best allocation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1243en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelQ20en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwGetränkeverpackungen_US
dc.subject.stwVerpackungs-Recyclingen_US
dc.subject.stwInternalisierung externer Effekteen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn the economics of bottle depositsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn856730726en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.