Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/188802
Authors: 
Ponte, Borja
Fernández, Isabel
Rosillo, Rafael
Parreño, José
García, Nazario
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management (JIEM) [ISSN:] 2013-0953 [Volume:] 9 [Year:] 2016 [Issue:] 5 [Pages:] 1020-1034
Abstract: 
Purpose: This paper aims to develop a theoretical framework for profit allocation, as a mechanism for aligning incentives, in collaborative supply chains. Design/methodology/approach: The issue of profit distribution is approached from a game-theoretic perspective. We use the nucleolus concept. The framework is illustrated through a numerical example based on the Beer Game scenario. Findings: The nucleolus offers a powerful perspective to tackle this problem, as it takes into consideration the bargaining power of the different echelons. We show that this framework outperforms classical alternatives. Research limitations/implications: The allocation of the overall supply chain profit is analyzed from a static perspective. Considering the dynamic nature of the problem would be an interesting next step. Practical implications: We provide evidence of drawbacks derived from classical solutions to the profit allocation problem. Real-world collaborative supply chains need of robust mechanisms like the one tackled in this work to align incentives from the various actors. Originality/value: Adopting an efficient collaborative solution is a major challenge for supply chains, since it is a wide and complex process that requires an appropriate scheme. Within this framework, profit allocation is essential.
Subjects: 
beer distribution game
game theory
incentive alignment
profit allocation
supply chain collaboration
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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