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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18866
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Holmlund, Bertil | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:53:26Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:53:26Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18866 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The paper presents a model that allows a unified analysis of sickness absence and searchunemployment. Sickness appears as random shocks to individual utility functions, interactswith individual searchand labor supply decisions and triggers movements across labor forcestates. The employed worker prefers absence for sufficiently severe sickness and theunemployed worker may prefer nonparticipation if the disutility of search is amplified bysickness. The decisions governing labor force transitions are influenced by social insurancebenefits available for sick or unemployed workers. We examine how these benefits affectindividual decisions on absence and search and the implications for employment,unemployment and nonparticipation. The normative analysis of the socially optimal benefitstructure suggests that there is, in general, a case for benefit di.erentiation across states ofnon-work. In particular, there is a case for a benefit structure that rewards active job search. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1227 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J65 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J64 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J21 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | sickness absence | en |
dc.subject.keyword | search | en |
dc.subject.keyword | unemployment | en |
dc.subject.keyword | sickness benefits | en |
dc.subject.keyword | unemployment benefits | en |
dc.subject.stw | Fehlzeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Krankheit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsuche | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitslosenversicherung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Sickness absence and search unemployment | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 856702781 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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