Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18862 
Full metadata record
Appears in Collections:
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDelfgaauw, Josseen
dc.contributor.authorDur, Roberten
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:24Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:24Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18862-
dc.description.abstractCivil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experienceswith civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy inwhich workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimalincentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions.When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sectorhighly attractive and may crowd out workers with a public service motivation. When effort isverifiable, the government optimally attracts motivated workers as well as the economy'slaziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted. Even thoughcontract distortions reduce aggregate welfare, a majority of society may be better off as publicgoods come at a lower cost.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1223en
dc.subject.jelJ3en
dc.subject.jelH1en
dc.subject.jelL3en
dc.subject.jelJ4en
dc.subject.jelM5en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpublic sector labour marketsen
dc.subject.keywordincentive contractsen
dc.subject.keywordwork ethicsen
dc.subject.keywordpublic service motivationen
dc.subject.stwÖffentlicher Diensten
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsethiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwNiederlandeen
dc.titleIncentives and workers' motivation in the public sector-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn85668192Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.