Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18860 
Full metadata record
Appears in Collections:
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorEvers, Michielen
dc.contributor.authorDe Mooij, Ruud A.en
dc.contributor.authorVollebergh, Herman R. J.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:23Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:23Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18860-
dc.description.abstractThis paper estimates Nash-type fiscal reaction functions for European governments competing for revenue from diesel excises. It appears that European governments strategically set their excise levels by responding to their neighbors? tax rates. This provides evidence for the presence of tax competition in diesel excises. In fact, a 10 percent higher rate in neighboring countries (in terms of the user price) induces a country to raise its own rate by between 2 and 3 percent. This impact is robust for alternative specifications. By imposing restrictions on excise levels, EU harmonization of excises in 1987 and the introduction of a minimum in 1992 exerted a positive impact on the excise level in a number of EU countries. It has not, however, significantly reduced the intensity of tax competition. Indeed, strategic tax responses have not significantly been reduced by these harmonization policies. We also find that high-tax countries appear to compete more aggressively than low-tax countries in the sense that they feature larger strategic tax responses. There is no significant difference between large and small countries.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1221en
dc.subject.jelH87en
dc.subject.jelR4en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.jelH23en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordDiesel exciseen
dc.subject.keywordstrategic tax settingen
dc.subject.keywordminimum ratesen
dc.subject.keywordEuropean Unionen
dc.subject.stwDieselkraftstoffen
dc.subject.stwMineralölsteueren
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben
dc.subject.stwEU-Steuerrechten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen
dc.titleTax competition under minimum rates : the case of European diesel excises-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn856679151en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.