Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18856
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dc.contributor.authorKim, Bum J.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSchlesinger, Harrisen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:22Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18856-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a competitive insurance market with adverse selection. Unlike the standard models, we assume that individuals receive the benefit of some type of potential government assistance that guarantees them a minimum level of wealth. For example, this assistance might be some type of government-sponsored relief program, or it might simply be some type of limited liability afforded via bankruptcy laws. Government assistance is calculated ex post of any insurance benefits. This alters the individuals? demand for insurance coverage. In turn, this affects equilibria in various insurance models of markets with adverse selection.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1217en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelH29en_US
dc.subject.jelG22en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordinsuranceen_US
dc.subject.keywordgovernment reliefen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen_US
dc.subject.stwSubventionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleAdverse selection in an insurance market with government-guaranteed subsistence levelsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn856674346en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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