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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18838
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Vogelsang, Ingo | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:53:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:53:14Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18838 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Performance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination suggests an approach based on the distinction between ultra-short, short and long periods. Ultra-short periods are marked by real-time pricing of point-to-point transmission services. Pricing in short periods involves fixed fees and adjustments via price-cap formulas or profit sharing. Productivity-enhancing incentives have to be tempered by long-term commitment considerations, so that profit sharing may dominate pure price caps. Investment incentives require long-term adjustments based on rate-of-return regulation with a ?used and useful? criterion. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1474 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L5 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L9 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Stromtarif | en |
dc.subject.stw | Stromnetz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Netzzugang | en |
dc.subject.stw | Unternehmensregulierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Electricity transmission pricing and performance-based regulation | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 488945666 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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