Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18837
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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:13Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:13Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18837-
dc.description.abstractIf firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduceasymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a largeshare in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. Asa consequence, equilibrium profits of both firms may increase, but the prize may be allocatedless efficiently. The reverse ownership structure is also likely to increase the profits of thefirms involved in the ownership relationship but without these negative efficiency effects.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1473en_US
dc.subject.jelL11en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordall-pay auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordexternalitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontestsen_US
dc.subject.keywordsilent minority shareholdingsen_US
dc.subject.keywordownership structureen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwStille Gesellschaften_US
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftliche Effizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSilent interests and all-pay auctionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn488944813en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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