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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18828
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Priks, Mikael | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:53:10Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:53:10Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18828 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Beginning in the mid-seventeenth century, England changed its system of raising revenuesfrom tax farming, combined with the granting of monopolies, to direct collection within thegovernment administration. Rents were then transferred from tax farmers and monopolists tothe central government such that English public finances improved dramatically compared toboth the old system and to its major competitor, France. We offer a theory explaining thisdevelopment. In our view, a cost of tax farming is the ex-ante inefficiency due to the auctionmechanism while a cost of direct collection is the ex-post monitoring cost the governmentincurs to prevent theft. When the monitoring cost is high the government therefore allows taxfarmers to extract large rents to enhance their up-front payments. In addition, becauserevenues materialize late under direct collection, and since the government faces limitedborrowing, a high default risk makes a system of up-front collection attractive. The results ofthe model are consistent with historical facts from England and France. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1464 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H11 | en |
dc.subject.jel | N43 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Direkte Steuer | en |
dc.subject.stw | Rententheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuer | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steuerfahndung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kosten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Staatsbankrott | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Grossbritannien | en |
dc.subject.stw | Frankreich | en |
dc.title | Optimal rent extraction in pre-industrial England and France : default risk and monitoring costs | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 488921589 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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