Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18828
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dc.contributor.authorPriks, Mikaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:10Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18828-
dc.description.abstractBeginning in the mid-seventeenth century, England changed its system of raising revenuesfrom tax farming, combined with the granting of monopolies, to direct collection within thegovernment administration. Rents were then transferred from tax farmers and monopolists tothe central government such that English public finances improved dramatically compared toboth the old system and to its major competitor, France. We offer a theory explaining thisdevelopment. In our view, a cost of tax farming is the ex-ante inefficiency due to the auctionmechanism while a cost of direct collection is the ex-post monitoring cost the governmentincurs to prevent theft. When the monitoring cost is high the government therefore allows taxfarmers to extract large rents to enhance their up-front payments. In addition, becauserevenues materialize late under direct collection, and since the government faces limitedborrowing, a high default risk makes a system of up-front collection attractive. The results ofthe model are consistent with historical facts from England and France.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1464en_US
dc.subject.jelH11en_US
dc.subject.jelN43en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwDirekte Steueren_US
dc.subject.stwRententheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSteueren_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerfahndungen_US
dc.subject.stwKostenen_US
dc.subject.stwStaatsbankrotten_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwGrossbritannienen_US
dc.subject.stwFrankreichen_US
dc.titleOptimal rent extraction in pre-industrial England and France : default risk and monitoring costsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn488921589en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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