Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18823
Authors: 
Jansen, Jos
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1459
Abstract: 
A firm actively manages its rival's beliefs by disclosing and concealing information on the size of its process innovation. The firm's disclosure strategy results from the trade-off between two effects on product market incentives. First, the firm's competitor learns that the firm is efficient, which discourages the competitor. Second, the competitor becomes more efficient himself, since he can expropriate part of the disclosed knowledge, which encourages him. I characterize the equilibrium disclosure strategies for any knowledge spillover in a simple Cournot duopoly model, and illustrate the results graphically. Moreover, I compare the strategic disclosure equilibria with equilibria under non-strategic disclosure.
Subjects: 
process innovation
Cournot competition
strategic substitutes
information disclosure
knowledge spillovers
JEL: 
L23
D82
O31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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