Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18818
Authors: 
Poutvaara, Panu
Wagener, Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1454
Abstract: 
We study the efficiency and distributional consequences of establishing and abolishing the draft in a dynamic model with overlapping generations, taking into account endogenous human capital formation as well as government budget constraints. The introduction of the draft initially benefits the older generation while harming the young and all future generations. Its Pareto-improving abolition requires levying age-dependent taxes on the young. These being infeasible, abolition of the draft would harm the old. The intergenerational incidence of the gains and losses from its introduction and abolition helps to explain the political allure of the draft.
Subjects: 
draft
conscription
education
intergenerational fairness
JEL: 
H20
D63
I21
H57
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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