Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18812 
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dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen
dc.contributor.authorHaller, Hansen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:03Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:03Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18812-
dc.description.abstractWe examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic the welfare of all household members moves in the same direction when bargaining power shifts, at the expense (or for the benefit) of outside consumers. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of households also impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a sociological group tends to benefit if he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers if others in his group do the same.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1448en
dc.subject.jelD70en
dc.subject.jelD62en
dc.subject.jelD50en
dc.subject.jelD10en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordhousehold behavioren
dc.subject.keywordbargaining poweren
dc.subject.keywordlocal and global changesen
dc.subject.keywordprice effectsen
dc.subject.keywordgeneral equilibriumen
dc.subject.stwHaushaltsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwKonsumtheorieen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungsmachten
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleBargaining power and equilibrium consumption-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn485181797en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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