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dc.contributor.authorDaido, Koheien
dc.contributor.authorItoh, Hideshien
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:02Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:02Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18808-
dc.description.abstractWe attempt to formulate and explain two types of self-fulfilling prophecy, called thePygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely tosucceed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely tosucceed). To this purpose, we extend a simple agency model with moral hazard and limitedliability by introducing a model of reference dependent preferences (RDP) by K'szegi andRabin (2004). We show that the agent with high expectations about his performance can beinduced to choose high effort with low-powered incentives. We then show that the principal'sexpectation has an important role as an equilibrium selection device.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1444en
dc.subject.jelM12en
dc.subject.jelM54en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelB49en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordself-fulfilling prophecyen
dc.subject.keywordPygmalion effecten
dc.subject.keywordGalatea effecten
dc.subject.keywordreference dependent preferencesen
dc.subject.keywordagency modelen
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen
dc.subject.stwNutzenen
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Haftungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe Pygmalion effect : an agency model with reference dependent preferences-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn48516292Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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