Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18804
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dc.contributor.authorBlumkin, Tomeren_US
dc.contributor.authorSadka, Efraimen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:00Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:00Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18804-
dc.description.abstractWe illustrate a novel informational feature of education, which the government may utilize. Discretionary decisions of individuals to acquire education may serve as an additional signal (to earned labor income) on the underlying unobserved innate earning ability, thereby mitigating the informational constraint faced by the government. We establish a case for taxing education, as a supplement to the labor income tax.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1440en_US
dc.subject.jelD6en_US
dc.subject.jelH2en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordre-distributionen_US
dc.subject.keywordeducationen_US
dc.subject.keywordinequalityen_US
dc.subject.stwSchulfinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwBildungsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwBildungsertragen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleA case for taxing educationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn485162237en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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