Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18804 
Full metadata record
Appears in Collections:
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBlumkin, Tomeren
dc.contributor.authorSadka, Efraimen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:00Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:00Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18804-
dc.description.abstractWe illustrate a novel informational feature of education, which the government may utilize. Discretionary decisions of individuals to acquire education may serve as an additional signal (to earned labor income) on the underlying unobserved innate earning ability, thereby mitigating the informational constraint faced by the government. We establish a case for taxing education, as a supplement to the labor income tax.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1440en
dc.subject.jelD6en
dc.subject.jelH2en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordoptimal taxationen
dc.subject.keywordre-distributionen
dc.subject.keywordeducationen
dc.subject.keywordinequalityen
dc.subject.stwSchulfinanzierungen
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen
dc.subject.stwBildungsverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwBildungsertragen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleA case for taxing education-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn485162237en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.