Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18803 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1439
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally, between exporting countries. We show that the equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the relative degree of competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry. With respect to national welfare, a more competitive upstream industry may benefit an exporting (upstream) country and harm an importing (downstream) country. On the other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm exporting countries.
Schlagwörter: 
successive oligopoly
strategic trade policy
industry concentration
JEL: 
L13
F13
F12
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
544.82 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.