Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18790 
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dc.contributor.authorPitlik, Hansen
dc.contributor.authorSchneider, Friedrich G.en
dc.contributor.authorStrotmann, Haralden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:54Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:54Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18790-
dc.description.abstractLegislative bargaining theory suggests that fiscal transfers among member states of a federation are determined to a substantial degree by political bargaining powers. Malapportionment of the states' population in the legislature is claimed to lead to disproportionally higher benefits to overrepresented states. The present paper analyses empirically the distribution of fiscal transfers in Germany's intergovernmental transfer system over the period 1970-2002. It can be shown that overrepresented states in the upper house receive disproportionate shares of transfers, while malapportionment in the lower house does not seem to matter. We also find empirical evidence that overrepresentation became more important over time.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1426en
dc.subject.jelD7en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordlegislative bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordoverrepresentationen
dc.subject.keywordfiscal transfer systemen
dc.subject.keywordGermanyen
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen
dc.subject.stwFöderalismusen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungsmachten
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.titleLegislative malapportionment and the politicization of Germany's intergovernmental transfer system-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn484747568en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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