Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18785 
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dc.contributor.authorBellettini, Giorgioen
dc.contributor.authorCeroni, Carlotta Bertien
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:52Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:52Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18785-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the determinants of immigration policy in an economy with entrepreneursand workers where a trade union has monopoly power over wages. The presence of the unionleads a benevolent government to implement a high level of immigration and induces awelfare loss not only from an aggregate point of view, but even from the point of view ofworkers. In the politico-economic equilibrium where interest groups lobby for immigration,we show the condition under which workers are no longer hurt by the presence of the union.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1421en
dc.subject.jelJ61en
dc.subject.jelJ51en
dc.subject.jelF22en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwEinwanderungen
dc.subject.stwMigrationspolitiken
dc.subject.stwLohnpolitiken
dc.subject.stwGewerkschaftlicher Organisationsgraden
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleWhen the union hurts the workers : a positive analysis of immigration policy-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn484732897en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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