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|dc.description.abstract||We show that, when school quality is measured by the educational standard and attaining thestandard requires costly effort, secondary education needs not be a hierarchy with privateschools offering better quality than public schools, as in Epple and Romano, 1998. Analternative configuration, with public schools offering a higher educational standard thanprivate schools, is also possible, in spite of the fact that tuition levied by private schools isstrictly positive. In our model, private schools can offer a lower educational standard at apositive price because they attract students with a relatively high cost of effort, who wouldfind the high standards of the public school excessively demanding. With the key parameterscalibrated on the available micro-econometric evidence from the US, our model predicts thatmajority voting in the US supports a system with high quality private schools and low qualitypublic schools, as assumed by Epple and Romano, 1998. This system, however, is not the onethat would be selected by the social planner, who prefers high quality public schoolscombined with low quality private schools.||en_US|
|dc.publisher|||aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich||en_US|
|dc.relation.ispartofseries|||aCESifo Working Paper |x1418||en_US|
|dc.title||Educational standards in private and public schools||en_US|
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