Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/187773 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2018-304
Verlag: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who have to make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For arbitrary distributions of risk, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff type, recommending consumption or abstinence according to the magnitude of the risk. Under a stronger bias for the present, the target group receiving a credible signal to abstain must be tightened. We compare this nudge with those favored by a health authority or a lobbyist. When some consumers are more strongly present-biased than others, a traffic-light nudge is optimal.
Schlagwörter: 
information design
information nudges
present-biased preferences
selfcontrol
JEL: 
C73
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
778.3 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.