[Journal:] China Journal of Accounting Research [ISSN:] 1755-3091 [Volume:] 8 [Year:] 2015 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 213-241
This paper investigates the influence of the economic value added (EVA) performance evaluation, issued in 2010 by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, on the value of the cash holdings of central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs). We find that EVA performance evaluation has some influence on the overinvestment of CSOE cash holdings and significantly increases the value of CSOE cash holdings compared with the cash holdings of local state-owned enterprises. The greater value of CSOE cash holdings derives from underinvestment modification and overinvestment restraint. The value of cash holdings increases more for companies with better accounting performance. Thus, the EVA performance evaluation policy increases CSOE efficiency. This study contributes to the emerging literature related to cash holdings and the economic consequences of the EVA performance evaluation policy. It expands the literature related to investor protection in countries experiencing economic transition.
EVA Performance evaluation The value of cash holdings Overinvestment Investor protection