Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/187624 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] China Journal of Accounting Research [ISSN:] 1755-3091 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2014 [Pages:] 165–177-
Verlag: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze data on Chinese non-state-listed firms and find that it is easier for firms with political connections to obtain long-term loans with extended debt maturities than it is for firms without political connections. Our investigation indicates that this phenomenon is significantly less common with increased media monitoring. Houston et al. (2011) find strong evidence that the state ownership of media is associated with higher levels of bank corruption in China, but our study shows that, to a certain extent, media monitoring can curb corruption.
Schlagwörter: 
Political connections
Long-term loans
Media monitoring
JEL: 
G34
D21
L51
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Dokumentart: 
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