Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/187610 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Citation: 
[Journal:] China Journal of Accounting Research [ISSN:] 1755-3091 [Volume:] 2 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2009 [Pages:] 71-99
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
In a changing transition economy, Chinese government regulations that adopt the relatively simple bright line rule formula are enforceable in practice. Taking the early reform-oriented policies of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) as an example, we find that the CSRC did not consider local enthusiasm for reform when allocating IPO resources because of the high enforcement costs involved. We also find that CSRC listed company regulations were enforced due to the lower costs involved in verifying regulatory violations, and that listed companies that completed the reform process were given priority in public refinancing. We present empirical evidence supporting the theoretical basis for the hypotheses outlined above. We also conclude that companies that completed the reform process in 2005 were of significantly higher quality and that the SEO regulation did not affect stock market efficiency. These findings enhance our understanding of the efficiency of government regulation in a transition economy.
Subjects: 
Government regulation
Enforcement
Economic consequences
Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR)
JEL: 
G32
G38
G15
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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