Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/187605 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Citation: 
[Journal:] China Journal of Accounting Research [ISSN:] 1755-3091 [Volume:] 1 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2008 [Pages:] 31-49
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
In emerging markets, the deviation between the ultimate controlling shareholders' voting rights and their cash flow rights (hereafter 'DVC') in the listed firms is quite prevalent. DVC could be introduced due to the ultimate controlling shareholders' opportunistic incentives, as well as by their incentives to improve firm efficiency. This study uses 229 listed firms ultimately controlled by individuals or families (hereafter 'entrepreneurial firms') for 2004 in China, to investigate the effect of DVC on firm value and to determine whether it is different between founder and non-founder controlled firms. We find that DVC has a positive effect on firm value for founder controlled firms. This result implies that investors believe that their interests are better protected by founder controlled firms than by non-founder controlled firms.
Subjects: 
Founder Control
Ownership Structure
Firm Value
China
Tunneling
JEL: 
G34
G32
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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