Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/187496 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 17-6
Publisher: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Abstract: 
We extend Kuhn's Theorem to extensive games with unawareness. This extension is not entirely obvious: First, extensive games with non-trivial unawareness involve a forest of partially ordered game trees rather than just one game tree. An information set at a history in one tree may consist of histories in a less expressive tree. Consequently, perfect recall takes a more complicated form as players may also become aware of new actions during the play. Second, strategies can only be partially an object of ex-ante choice in games with unawareness. Finally, histories that a player may expect to reach with a strategy profile may not be the histories that actually occur with this strategy profile, requiring us to define appropriate notions of equivalence of strategies.
Subjects: 
perfect recall
mixed strategy
behavior strategy
unawareness
JEL: 
C72
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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