Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/187495 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 17-5
Publisher: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Abstract: 
We study common belief of rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a model of qualitative beliefs. We characterize the three main solution concepts for such games, viz., Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS), Iterated Deletion of Boergers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP), by means of gradually restrictive properties imposed on the models of qualitative beliefs. As a corollary, we prove that IDIP refines IDBS, which refines IDSDS.
Subjects: 
Qualitative likelihood relation
ordinal payoffs
common belief of rationality
iterative deletion procedures
JEL: 
C7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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