Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/187494
Authors: 
Schipper, Burkhard C.
Meier, Martin
Heifetz, Aviad
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper 17-4
Abstract: 
We present a new solution concept for strategic games called comprehensive rationalizability that embodies "common cautious belief in rationality" based on a sound epistemic characterization in a universal type space. It refines rationalizability, but it neither refines nor is refined by iterated admissibility. Nevertheless, it coincides with iterated admissibility in many relevant economic applications.
Subjects: 
Common assumption of rationality
common belief in rationality
iterated admissibility
rationalizability
lexicographic belief systems
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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