Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18733
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dc.contributor.authorSimonovits, Andrásen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:30Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:30Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18733-
dc.description.abstractThe traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetricinformation on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond,2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-bestbenefit-retirement-age schedule. Trying to combine the two approaches, the present paperdetermines the neutral (redistribution-free) second-best solution. This neutral solution is,however, often Pareto-dominated by the redistributive one.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1370en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelH55en_US
dc.subject.jelD91en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordflexible retirementen_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordactuarial fairness (neutrality)en_US
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen_US
dc.subject.stwFlexible Altersgrenzeen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungstechniken_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen_US
dc.subject.stwSecond Besten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDesigning benefit rules for flexible retirement with or without redistributionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477488730en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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