Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18733 
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dc.contributor.authorSimonovits, Andrásen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:30Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:30Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18733-
dc.description.abstractThe traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetricinformation on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond,2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-bestbenefit-retirement-age schedule. Trying to combine the two approaches, the present paperdetermines the neutral (redistribution-free) second-best solution. This neutral solution is,however, often Pareto-dominated by the redistributive one.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1370en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelH55en
dc.subject.jelD91en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordflexible retirementen
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen
dc.subject.keywordactuarial fairness (neutrality)en
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen
dc.subject.stwFlexible Altersgrenzeen
dc.subject.stwVersicherungstechniken
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen
dc.subject.stwSecond Besten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDesigning benefit rules for flexible retirement with or without redistribution-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn477488730en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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