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Autoren: 
Simonovits, András
Datum: 
2004
Reihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1370
Zusammenfassung: 
The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetric information on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond, 2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-best benefit-retirement-age schedule. Trying to combine the two approaches, the present paper determines the neutral (redistribution-free) second-best solution. This neutral solution is, however, often Pareto-dominated by the redistributive one.
Schlagwörter: 
flexible retirement
asymmetric information
actuarial fairness (neutrality)
mechanism design
JEL: 
D82
H55
D91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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