Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18725
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dc.contributor.authorHainz, Christaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:26Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:26Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18725-
dc.description.abstractThe number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. Westudy a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank's decision to liquidate badfirms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated.Second, it loses the rent from incumbent customers that is due to its informational advantage.We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium inwhich the optimal number of firms is liquidated. There is also a range where improvinginstitutions may decrease the number of bad firms liquidated.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1362en_US
dc.subject.jelK10en_US
dc.subject.jelG33en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcredit marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbank competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation sharingen_US
dc.subject.keywordbankruptcyen_US
dc.subject.keywordrelationship bankingen_US
dc.subject.stwKonkursen_US
dc.subject.stwLiquidationen_US
dc.subject.stwBankgeschäften_US
dc.subject.stwFirmenkundengeschäften_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwInstitutionelle Infrastrukturen_US
dc.titleQuality of institutions, credit markets and bankruptcyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477509967en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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