Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18725 
Full metadata record
Appears in Collections:
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHainz, Christaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:26Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:26Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18725-
dc.description.abstractThe number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. Westudy a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank's decision to liquidate badfirms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated.Second, it loses the rent from incumbent customers that is due to its informational advantage.We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium inwhich the optimal number of firms is liquidated. There is also a range where improvinginstitutions may decrease the number of bad firms liquidated.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1362en
dc.subject.jelK10en
dc.subject.jelG33en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcredit marketsen
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen
dc.subject.keywordbank competitionen
dc.subject.keywordinformation sharingen
dc.subject.keywordbankruptcyen
dc.subject.keywordrelationship bankingen
dc.subject.stwKonkursen
dc.subject.stwLiquidationen
dc.subject.stwBankgeschäften
dc.subject.stwFirmenkundengeschäften
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwInstitutionelle Infrastrukturen
dc.titleQuality of institutions, credit markets and bankruptcy-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn477509967en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.