Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18715 
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dc.contributor.authorBerlemann, Michaelen
dc.contributor.authorDittrich, Marcusen
dc.contributor.authorMarkwardt, Guntheren
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:22Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18715-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we present three simple theoretical models to explain the influence of thepossibility to make non-binding announcements on investment behaviour in public goodssettings. Our models build on the idea that voluntary contributions to the supply of a publicgood might be motivated by some form of joy of giving. We show that the possibility to makenon-binding announcements has a positive effect on cooperative behaviour, especially ifindividual announcements and factual investments are communicated to the players after eachround. We also show that this result holds true even though the players have an incentive tooverstate their true degrees of cooperativeness. Altogether, our theoretical considerationspoint in the direction that revealing as much information on individual intentions and factualbehaviour as possible enhances cooperative behaviour. These conclusions are broadlyconfirmed by the results of a series of classroom experiments we present.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1352en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.keywordannouncementsen
dc.subject.keywordjoy of givingen
dc.subject.keywordexperimental economicsen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwExperimenten
dc.subject.stwAnkündigungseffekten
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe value of non-binding announcements in public goods experiments : some theory and experimental evidence-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn477414303en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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