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dc.contributor.authorEggert, Wolfgangen
dc.contributor.authorKolmar, Martinen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:20Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:20Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18709-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze the structure of contest equilibria with a variable number ofindividuals. First we analyze a situation where the total prize depends on the number of agentsand where every single agent faces opportunity costs of investing in the contest. Second weanalyze a situation where the agents face a trade-off between productive and appropriativeinvestments. Here, the number of agents may also influence the productivity of productiveinvestments. It turns out that both types of contests may lead to opposing results concerningthe optimal number of individuals depending on the strength of size effects. Whereas in theformer case individual utility is u-shaped when the number of agents increases, the oppositeholds true for the latter case. We discuss the implications of our findings for the case ofanarchic societies and competition on markets.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1346en
dc.subject.jelL10en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordsize effectsen
dc.subject.keywordcontestsen
dc.subject.keywordanarchyen
dc.subject.keywordcompetitionen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbstheorieen
dc.subject.stwMarktstrukturen
dc.titleContests with size effects-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn477414249en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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