Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18709
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dc.contributor.authorEggert, Wolfgangen_US
dc.contributor.authorKolmar, Martinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:20Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:20Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18709-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze the structure of contest equilibria with a variable number ofindividuals. First we analyze a situation where the total prize depends on the number of agentsand where every single agent faces opportunity costs of investing in the contest. Second weanalyze a situation where the agents face a trade-off between productive and appropriativeinvestments. Here, the number of agents may also influence the productivity of productiveinvestments. It turns out that both types of contests may lead to opposing results concerningthe optimal number of individuals depending on the strength of size effects. Whereas in theformer case individual utility is u-shaped when the number of agents increases, the oppositeholds true for the latter case. We discuss the implications of our findings for the case ofanarchic societies and competition on markets.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1346en_US
dc.subject.jelL10en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordsize effectsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontestsen_US
dc.subject.keywordanarchyen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompetitionen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktstrukturen_US
dc.titleContests with size effectsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477414249en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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