Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18707 
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dc.contributor.authorBerger, Helgeen
dc.contributor.authorMueller, Tillen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:19Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:19Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18707-
dc.description.abstractThe likely extension of the euro area has triggered a debate on the organization of the ECB, inparticular on the apparent mismatch between relative economic size and voting rights in theCouncil. We present a simple model of optimal representation in a federal central bankaddressing this question. Optimal voting weights reflect two opposing forces: the wish toinsulate common monetary policy from changing preferences at the national level, and theattempt to avoid an overly active or passive reaction to idiosyncratic national economicshocks. A perfect match between economic size and voting rights is rarely optimal, andneither is the ?one country, one vote principle?. Empirically, there are indications that thepattern of over- and under-representation of member countries in the ECB Council might beextreme by the standards of the US Fed and German Bundesbank and not always optimal.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1344en
dc.subject.jelE52en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelF33en
dc.subject.jelE58en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCentral Banken
dc.subject.keywordFederal Central Banken
dc.subject.keywordCurrency Unionen
dc.subject.keywordoptimal representationen
dc.subject.keywordvotingen
dc.subject.keywordECBen
dc.subject.stwZentralbanken
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunionen
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsregelen
dc.subject.stwLandesgrösseen
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen
dc.titleHow should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn477413463en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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