Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18707
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dc.contributor.authorBerger, Helgeen_US
dc.contributor.authorMueller, Tillen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:19Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:19Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18707-
dc.description.abstractThe likely extension of the euro area has triggered a debate on the organization of the ECB, inparticular on the apparent mismatch between relative economic size and voting rights in theCouncil. We present a simple model of optimal representation in a federal central bankaddressing this question. Optimal voting weights reflect two opposing forces: the wish toinsulate common monetary policy from changing preferences at the national level, and theattempt to avoid an overly active or passive reaction to idiosyncratic national economicshocks. A perfect match between economic size and voting rights is rarely optimal, andneither is the ?one country, one vote principle?. Empirically, there are indications that thepattern of over- and under-representation of member countries in the ECB Council might beextreme by the standards of the US Fed and German Bundesbank and not always optimal.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1344en_US
dc.subject.jelE52en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelF33en_US
dc.subject.jelE58en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCentral Banken_US
dc.subject.keywordFederal Central Banken_US
dc.subject.keywordCurrency Unionen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal representationen_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.keywordECBen_US
dc.subject.stwZentralbanken_US
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunionen_US
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsregelen_US
dc.subject.stwLandesgrösseen_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleHow should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477413463en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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