Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18680
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dc.contributor.authorRiedel, Franken_US
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmaren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:07Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:07Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18680-
dc.description.abstractThe present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily manybidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that thegame is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficientallocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small.In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficientallocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1315en_US
dc.subject.jelD45en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSimultaneous Ascending Auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordweak dominanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordmulti-unit auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordgame theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVollkommene Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleImmediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477398634en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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