Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18668
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dc.contributor.authorJametti, Marioen_US
dc.contributor.authorvon Ungern-Sternberg, Thomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:52:02Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:52:02Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18668-
dc.description.abstractWe model natural disaster insurance in France. We explicitly take into account the maininstitutional features of the system, such as the uniform premium rate in both high and lowrisk regions and the existence of a state reinsurance company. Our model indicates that theinstitutional set-up is fundamentally flawed. We find that the market is likely to lead to'specialist? equilibria, where insurers specialize in serving either high or low risk regions. Asa result the reinsurance company, which offers cover to all insurers at the same price, is likelyto suffer from a portfolio with mainly ?bad? risks. We show that increasing the premium ratecustomers have to pay, a policy undertaken by the French authorities, will not necessarilysolve these problems and comes at a high cost to the final consumer (and taxpayer).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1303en_US
dc.subject.jelL11en_US
dc.subject.jelG22en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordproperty insuranceen_US
dc.subject.keywordreinsuranceen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk selectionen_US
dc.subject.stwElementarschadenversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwFrankreichen_US
dc.titleDisaster insurance or a disastrous insurance : natural disaster insurance in Franceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn477260624en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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