Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Full metadata record
|dc.description.abstract||Guilds are social scientists? favoured historical example of institutions generating a 'socialcapital? of trust that benefited entire economies. This article considers this view in the light ofempirical findings for early modern Europe. It draws the distinction between a ?particularized?trust in persons of known attributes and a ?generalized? trust that applies even to strangers.This is paralleled by the distinction between a ?differential? trust in institutions that enforcethe rights of certain groups and a ?uniform? trust in impartial institutions that enforce therights of all. Guilds had the potential to generate the particularized and differential trust tosolve market failures relating to product quality, training, and innovation, although theempirical findings suggest that they often failed to fulfil this potential. Guilds also had thepotential to abuse their trust, and the empirical findings show that they indeed manipulatedtheir social capital of shared norms, common information, mutual sanctions, and collectivepolitical action to benefit their members at others? expense, blocking the spread of generalizedand uniform trust. Counter to the assumptions of social capital theory, the example of preindustrialguilds suggests that the particularized and differential trust fostered by associativeinstitutions do not favour but hinder the generalized and uniform trust fostered by impartialinstitutions.||en_US|
|dc.publisher|||aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich||en_US|
|dc.relation.ispartofseries|||aCESifo Working Paper |x1302||en_US|
|dc.title||The use and abuse of trust : social capital and its deployment by early modern guilds||en_US|
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.