Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185976
Authors: 
Schneider, Udo
Zerth, Jürgen
Year of Publication: 
2011
Citation: 
[Journal:] Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics [ISSN:] 2235-6282 [Volume:] 147 [Year:] 2011 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 71-106
Abstract: 
This paper explores the effects of insurance parameters and complementary information environment on the patient's primary prevention activity. The theoretical model is based on a principal-agent setting in which the patient acts as an agent in deciding about his prevention efforts. The insurer chooses the coverage level and therefore the level of patient's cost sharing and decides on his monitoring activities. The empirical analysis looks at the patient's prevention decision in the case of smoking. Using a hazard model in discrete time, the decision to change behaviour depends on health status, education, age and working time but not on the insurance system.
Subjects: 
incentives in prevention
information distribution
hazard model
JEL: 
I12
D82
C23
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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