Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185884
Authors: 
Spirig, Beat
Weder, Rolf
Year of Publication: 
2008
Citation: 
[Journal:] Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics [ISSN:] 2235-6282 [Volume:] 144 [Year:] 2008 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 85-114
Abstract: 
Why do some countries join the EU earlier than others, why do others wait? In order to answer this question we apply the theory of investment under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) to the decision on EU-membership. We develop a simplified model of two periods to study how the value of waiting depends among other things on the degree of uncertainty. The results give rise to a country?s position to deliberately postpone a membership in order to keep the option to join later if this is desirable. After interpreting the results we illustrate the framework by applying it to Switzerland and the new EU-members, taking into account the EU?s draft of the Constitutional Treaty. We argue that the approach provides interesting insights regarding EU-membership, in general, and the Swiss position, in particular.
Subjects: 
European integration
investment under uncertainty
EU-membership
JEL: 
D81
F02
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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