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Autoren: 
Bönte, Werner
Wiethaus, Lars
Datum: 
2005
Reihe/Nr.: 
RWI Discussion Papers 34
Zusammenfassung: 
Abuyer?s technical knowledge may increase the efficiency of its supplier. Suppliers, however, frequently maintain relationships with additional buyers. Knowledge disclosure then bears the risk of benefiting one?s own competitor due to opportunistic knowledge transmission through the common supplier. We show that in one-shot relationships no knowledge disclosure takes place because the supplier has an incentive for knowledge transmission and, in anticipation of this outcome, buyers refuse to disclose any of their knowledge. In repeated relationships knowledge disclosure is stabilized by larger technological proximity between buyers and suppliers and destabilized by the absolute value of the knowledge.
Schlagwörter: 
Knowledge Transfer
Knowledge Spillovers
Cooperation
Innovation
Repeated Games
JEL: 
L13
L20
O32
O31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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