Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/185770 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 100
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper shows that the possibility of collusion between an agent and a supervisor imposes no restrictions on the set of implementable social choice functions (SCF) and associated payoff vectors. Any SCF and any payoff profile that are implementable if the supervisor′s information was public is also implementable when this information is private and collusion is possible. To implement a given SCF we propose a one-sided mechanism that endogenously creates private information for the supervisor vis-à-vis the agent, and conditions both players′ payoffs on this endogenous information. We show that in such a mechanism all collusive side-bargaining fails, similar to the trade failure in Akerlof′s (1970) car market and in models of bilateral trade.
Schlagwörter: 
mechanism design
collusion
asymmetric information
correlation
JEL: 
D82
D83
L51
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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