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Autoren: 
von Wangenheim, Jonas
Datum: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 98
Zusammenfassung: 
I derive a social planner\'s optimal information design in an environment with quasi-hyperbolic discounting consumers without commitment. Consumption induces instantaneous utility, but unknown delayed cost. Consumers may or may not acquire additional costless information on the cost parameter. The planner\'s optimal signal can be interpreted as an incentive compatible consumption recommendation whenever the cost parameter is below some cut-off. Welfare strictly exceeds the one under full information. I characterize distributional conditions under which welfare attains first best.
Schlagwörter: 
bayesian persuasion
present bias
hyperbolic discounting
rational inattention
JEL: 
D01
D18
D62
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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