Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185743
Autoren: 
Eyster, Erik
Rabin, Matthew
Weizsäcker, Georg
Datum: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 73
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate experimentally whether social learners appreciate the redundancy of information conveyed by their observed predecessors\' actions. Each participant observes a private signal and enters an estimate of the sum of all earlier-moving participants\' signals plus her own. In a first treatment, participants move single-file and observe all predecessors\' entries; Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) predicts that each participant simply add her signal to her immediate predecessor\'s entry. Although 75% of participants do so, redundancy neglect by the other 25% generates excess imitation and mild inefficiencies. In a second treatment, participants move four per period; BNE predicts that most players anti-imitate some observed entries. Such anti-imitation occurs in 35% of the most transparent cases, and 16% overall. The remaining redundancy neglect creates dramatic excess imitation and inefficiencies: late-period entries are far too extreme, and on average participants would earn substantially more by ignoring their predecessors altogether.
Schlagwörter: 
social learning
redundancy neglect
experiments
higher-order beliefs
JEL: 
B49
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
2.55 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.